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SEARCHES WOVEN FROM TERRY
CLOTH: HOW THE PLAIN FEEL
DOCTRINE PLUS TERRY EQUALS
PRETEXTUAL SEARCH
[TJhere is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution
sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the
privacy of us all.'
Pacing back and forth in front of the Seven-Eleven at 2:00 a.m.,
the disheveled man seems nervous and excited, or perhaps confused
and disoriented. Police officers observe him repeatedly peering into
the window of the convenience store, while fumbling with an object in
his pants pocket. After studying this continued activity for approxi-
mately fifteen minutes, the officers decide to investigate. Suspicious
that the man is "casing" the Seven-Eleven in contemplation of robbing
it, and fearing that the man is armed and dangerous, the officers stop
him and perform a protective search for weapons. While patting down
the man's legs, an officer feels a number of small lumps in one of the
suspect's pants pockets, which he immediately believes to be crack
cocaine wrapped in cellophane. Based on his twenty years of law
enforcement experience, the confused state of mind and suspicious
nature of the suspect, and the officer's training in the recognition of
crack cocaine, the officer reaches into the man's pocket and seizes its
contents. Much to the zealous officer's chagrin, the pocket contains a
number of pills in a plastic bag, along with a related prescription for
treatment of paranoid schizophrenia, and a grocery list. The suspect
is released to do his grocery shopping.
In the above hypothetical, although the seizure of the grocery list
and pills—and the resulting discovery that the man apparently suf-
fered from paranoid schizophrenia—may seem to be a serious invasion
of privacy, it would be perfectly constitutional according to the United
States Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Minnesota v. Dickerson. 2 In
Dickerson, the Supreme Court recognized, for the first time, what is
now known as the "plain feel" exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement. 3 The Court ruled unanimously that when a law
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987).
z
 See 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993).
3 See id. at 2134.
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enforcement officer conducting a lawful protective patdown search
detects, by feel, something other than a weapon, he or she may seize
it without a warrant if the officer's sense of touch makes it immediately
apparent that the felt object is contraband. 4
The Court stipulated, however, that the officer may only seize
contraband if he or she discovered it while remaining within the
bounds of a lawful patdown search.' Thus, in a purely formal, logical
and legal sense, the Court's decision arguably is sound. In a functional,
practical sense, however, the decision has the potential to result in
police abuse and misconduct. Faced with a strong desire to make an
arrest, a police officer may conduct a search for contraband under the
pretext of a weapons frisk, or may extend the scope of a patdown
search if the officer feels something possibly resembling contraband.
Confident that a trier of fact would more likely believe a police officer
than a criminal defendant, the officer could claim that the illegal
nature of the felt object became immediately apparent on touch. Thus,
Dickerson provides an incentive for police officers to conduct illegal
searches.
This Note examines the Dickerson decision and its legal and prac-
tical implications on the criminal justice process. Section I examines
the backdrop of the plain feel doctrine, including stop-and-frisks, the
plain view doctrine, and plain feel cases prior to Dickerson.' Section II
examines the details of Dickerson.' Section III reviews plain feel deci-
sions subsequent to Dickerson.' Section IV examines the flaws in the
Court's reasoning, and suggests that, although the decision may be
logically consistent, its practical effects are frightening. 9 Finally, Section
V discusses alternatives and modifications to the plain feel doctrine
that balance society's interest in fighting crime against the individual's
interest in being free from unlawful searches.'°
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK
The Fourth Amendment provides that It] he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
4
 See id. at 2136,2159.
,5
	 id. at 2139. A patdown search is lawful if the officer performs the search in accordance
with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,27 (1968). See infra
notes 50-66 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's
holding in Terry.
See infra notes 11-174 and accompanying text.
7
 See infra notes 175-232 and accompanying text_
8 See infra notes 233-61 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 262-83 and accompanying text.
t° See infra notes 284-301 and accompanying text.
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unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . ."'l This amendment
is one of the clearest examples of balancing the age-old conflict be-
tween social control and individual liberty. 12
 On the one hand, law
enforcement wants free rein to maintain order and enforce the law."
On the other hand, there is a deep-rooted human desire to retain
autonomy, maintain privacy, and enforce the security of one's person
and residence."
Two threshold requirements must be met before the Fourth Amend-
ment's protections will apply in a particular situation. 16 First, the Fourth
Amendment applies only to action by the government, not to private
conduct.' 6 Second, the conduct in question must constitute a search.l 7
The Supreme Court, however, has had difficulty defining what consti-
tutes a search.'s In early Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court closely
tied its definition of a search to property concepts."' Thus, the Court
recognized a government invasion as a search only when government
officials physically intruded into a "constitutionally protected area."2°
Modern methods of police investigation, which could be accom-
plished without the necessity for physical intrusion onto one's prop-
11 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12 See, e.g., New jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (high school's interest in maintain-
ing discipline and order justified the warrandess search of student's purse by high school authori-
ties); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703-04 (1983) (government interest in narcotics
investigation may justify brief seizure of luggage); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 24 (1968)
(government interest in protecting police and public justifies warrantless stop-and-frisk).
18 See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337; Place, 462 U.S. at 703; Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
14 See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337; Place, 462 U.S. at 705; Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25.].5
	 7:L.O., 469 U.S. at 333, 337.
16 See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (Fourth Amendment intended as
restraint upon activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be limitation upon other
than government agencies); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (Fourth Amend-
ment limits action of federal government, not individual misconduct of federal officials).
17 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
353 (1967).
18 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 2.1(a), at 223 (1978).
t 3` See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (placing tap on telephone wires
and thereby eavesdropping on defendant's telephone conversations did not amount to search
within meaning of Fourth Amendment, because activity did not constitute trespass); Hester v.
United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (revenue officers trespassing on defendant's land did not
amount to search, because open fields were not constitutionally protected areas).
20 See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (Fourth Amendment violated
where police officers attached microphone to heating duct of house used by defendants). "Con-
stitutionally protected areas" were those enumerated in the Fourth Amendment itself: "persons,"
including the bodies and clothing of individuals; "houses," including apartments, hotel rooms,
garages, business offices, stores and warehouses; "papers," such as letters; and "effects," such as
automobiles. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 2.1(a), at 223-24.
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erty, led the way to the abandonment of the property-based approach. 2 '
It was not until 1967, in Katz v. United States, that the United States
Supreme Court completely eradicated its reliance on property inter-
ests, and created the notion of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 22
In Katz, the Court held that the Government's placement of a listening
device on the wall of a public telephone booth, in order to listen to
and record the defendant's conversation, constituted a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." The Court rejected the
argument that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because the
electronic device did not physically penetrate the wall of the telephone
booth.24
 According to the Court, the Fourth Amendment "protects
people, not places," and therefore its scope cannot depend on the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.25
Rather, the Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment's applicability
depends on whether the government violated an individual's legiti-
mate expectation of privacy. 26
 Thus, the Court held that government
activity which intruded on an individual's privacy constituted a search
protected by the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether a physical
trespass occurred. 27
Upon a determination that the government executed a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, a court must deter-
mine whether that search required a warrant. 28
 The warrant require-
ment of the Fourth Amendment requires that an impartial judicial
officer assess whether the police have probable cause to make an arrest
or conduct a search. 29
 Searches conducted without a warrant are "per
21 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53 (electronic surveillance of public telephone booth constitutes
search). The premise that property interests controlled the right of the government to search
and seize was discredited by the Court's statement in Warden v. Hayden that "the principal object
of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property." 387 U.S. 294, 304
(1967) (reversing "mere evidence" rule which limited police to seizing only fruits, instrumentali-
ties of crime and contraband, and which prohibited police from seizing items of mere evidentiary
value).
22 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see
also Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REV. 154, 155
(1977).
23 389 U.S. at 353.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan suggested a twofold requirement for determin-
ing when an individual possesses a legitimate expectation of privacy, Id. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). First, the person must have exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy.
Id. (Harlan, J., concurring). Second, the expectation must be one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
27 See id. at 353.
27/ See, e.g., New Jersey v. TS-0., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
29
 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1967). Probable cause is the level of suspicion
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se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."'" Over time,
the Supreme Court has upheld warrantless searches based on a num-
ber of these exceptions.''
If the government commits a Fourth Amendment violation, the
court must determine whether or not to exclude evidence seized dur-
ing the search from an accused's trial.s2 The exclusion of evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is embodied in a
judicially created doctrine, known as the exclusionary rule."' The rule
dictates that the government may not use evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment in prosecuting individuals whose rights
have been violated.34 Since 1914, when the United States Supreme
Court first adopted the exclusionary rule,35 lawyers, judges, and legal
scholars have endlessly debated its purposes and desirability, and have
required to justify certain governmental intrusions upon interests protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment, See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227 (1983) (probable cause to be determined by
totality of circumstances); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (arrest and subsequent search
and seizure invalid due to lack of probable cause). As a general rule, probable cause for a search
or seizure is required whether or not police obtain a warrant. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 155-56 (1925) (probable cause is standard for reasonableness of warrantless searches and
seizures). The Supreme Court, however, has applied a lesser standard of "reasonable suspicion"
to certain situations, where the intrusion on individual privacy is minimal and is outweighed by
an important government interest. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333-34 (1990) (reasonable
suspicion that person in home posed danger to those on arrest scene justified protective sweep
of home during in-home arrest); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541
(1985) (reasonable suspicion that traveler smuggled contraband in alimentary canal justified
prolonged detention of traveler at border); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985)
(reasonable suspicion that student violated or is violating law or school rules justified limited
search of student and belongings); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. f , 22-24 (1968) (reasonable suspicion
that suspect engaged in criminal activity justified brief investigatory detention; reasonable suspi-
cion that suspect was armed and dangerous justified patdown search for weapons),
3° Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (Fourth Amendment imposes presumptive warrant requirement for
all searches and seizures); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 ("police must, whenever practicable, obtain
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure").
31 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806-07 (1982) (automobile searches); Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (road blocks); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
272 (1973) (border searches); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1973) (consent);
Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (search incident to arrest); Terry, 392 U.S. at
30 (stop-and-frisk); Warden, 387 U.S. at 298-99 (hot pursuit).
32 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (exclusionary rule applies in state court to
evidence obtained through Fourth Amendment violation); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
398 (1914) (exclusionary rule applies in federal court to evidence obtained through Fourth
Amendment violation). In its determination of whether the exclusionary rule applies in a par-
ticular situation, the court balances the societal costs against the benefits from exclusion, See
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974) (exclusionary rule not applied to grand jury
proceedings).
" See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
" See Ma/p, 367 U.S. at 655; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
15 See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
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proposed alternatives to the rule. 36
 Proponents claim that the exclu-
sionary rule provides the only effective method by which courts can
safeguard the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment." Oppo-
nents argue that the rule is not justified in light of the burden that it
imposes on effective law enforcement. 39
Deterrence of police misconduct is the primary justification for
the exclusionary rule. 39
 The rule rests on the hope that law enforce-
ment officials will be deterred from unlawful searches and seizures if
courts suppress illegally seized, albeit trustworthy, evidence often enough,
thereby depriving officers of any benefits that might be gained from
illegal conduct.° The United States Supreme Court created the rule
in order to give meaning and teeth to the protections guaranteed by
the Constitution.4 ' In the absence of the exclusionary rule, an individ-
ual was left with no remedy for a violation of his or her constitutional
rights.42
Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has significantly chipped away
at the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and at the scope
and applicability of the exclusionary rule.43
 The Supreme Court began
this retrenchment of Fourth Amendment law not by overruling prior
decisions, but by exploiting potential loopholes within existing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. 44
 With respect to the Dickerson decision,
the two most pertinent exceptions to the warrant requirement are the
stop-and-frisk and the plain view doctrines.*
A. The Warrantless Stop
-and
-Frisk
Although police officers have temporarily detained suspects and
even frisked them since the establishment of organized police forces,
See, e.g., Comment, Trends in Legal Commentary on the Exclusionary Rule, 65 j. CRIM. L &
CRIMINOLOGY 373, 373 (1974).
37 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 411 (1971) (Burger, Cj., dissenting) (damages recoverable upon proof of injuries resulting
from violation of Fourth Amendment); see also Comment, supra note 36, at 375.
38 See John B. Waite, fudges and the Crime Burden, 54 MICH. L. REV. 169, 169 (1955); Harvey
Wingo, Growing Disillusionment with the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573, 583 (1971).
39 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 413 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
48 Id. at 415 (Burger, Cj., dissenting).
41 Id. (Burger, C.j., dissenting).
42 Id. (Burger, CJ., dissenting). In Bivens, however, the Court created a damage remedy for
injuries suffered as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 397.
43 See Silas j. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
257, 259 (1984).
44 Silas J. Wassersu-om, The Court's Turn Toward a General Reasonableness Interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119, 121 (1989).
45 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136-37 (1993).
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the law traditionally was silent on the legality of this custom." In the
1960s, however, several state statutes and cases attempted to define the
authority of the police to make such stops on less than probable cause
to arrest.47 Some police officers allegedly used these forms of stop-and-
frisk for harassment rather than for legitimate preventive law enforce-
ment." This harassment underscored the need for controls that rec-
onciled these competing problems under the Fourth Amendment."
In 1968, in Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court held
that a police officer may stop and frisk a person when the officer can
reasonably conclude that the suspect may be engaged in criminal
activity and may be armed and dangerous." While on patrol, a Cleve-
land police detective observed two men, Terry and Chilton, alternately
walk past some stores." While walking, each man paused to peer into
a particular store window, continued past the store, turned around to
again peer into the store window, and then rejoined his companion. 52
The men repeated this pattern approximately twelve times, for a pe-
riod of ten to twelve minutes." Suspecting that the men were planning
a robbery, and fearing they had a gun, the officer approached the men,
identified himself as a police officer and asked the men for their
names." When the men "mumbled something" in response, the officer
grabbed Terry, spun him around, and patted down the outside of his
clothing.55 The officer felt a pistol in Terry's breast pocket, which he
removed." The officer then arrested Terry for carrying a concealed
weapon.57 The officer later testified that he patted the men down only
to discover whether they were carrying weapons."
In determining whether the officer's patdown weapons search
violated the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court
45 See Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and
Beyond, 67 Mu: it. L. Rev. 39, 42-43 (1968).
47
 See id. at. 44.
49 See Paul G. Chevigny, Police Abuses in Connection with the Law of Search and Seizure, 5 Cant.
L. BULL. 3, 22 (1969); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1968).
49 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12.
5° Id. at 30. This is now referred to as the "reasonable suspicion" test. See, e.g., Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1993).
L
 'ferry, 392 U.S. at 5-6.
52 Id. at 6.
u Id.
54 Id. at 6-7.
55 Id. at 7.
56
 Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
57 Id.
• 8 Id.
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applied a balancing test. 59
 The Court weighed the governmental inter-
est in investigating crime, together with the more immediate interest
of protecting police and the public, against the intrusion on individual
rights.° The Court concluded that the governmental interest out-
weighed the intrusion on individual rights. 61
 Accordingly, the Court
held that reasonable suspicion, rather than the higher standard of
probable cause, could support a protective search for weapons. 62 Be-
cause protective searches are not supported by probable cause, how-
ever, the Court warned that the scope of the search must be very
limited." According to the Court, the sole justification of the search is
to protect the police officer and others nearby. 64
 Thus, police officers
must confine the scope of the search to an intrusion reasonably de-
signed to discover weapons." The Court concluded that the officer
lawfully stopped and frisked Terry to investigate a possible crime, and
evidence seized by the officer could be admitted at trial."
B. The Plain View Doctrine
The plain view doctrine is an exception to the warrant require-
ment in the sense that when an object is in "plain view," the Fourth
Amendment does not apply. 67
 The doctrine allows police officers to
make a warrantless seizure of contraband and other evidence open to
view." Police officers may seize evidence in plain view because an
individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in items
that the officer can plainly see. 69
 By authorizing the seizure of the item,
/d. at 20-21.
613 1d. at 22-24.
61
 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 1d. at 29.
"5 Id.
66 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
67 See, e.g., Arizona v, Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 465 (1971). Although plain view was initially characterized as an independent exception to
the warrant requirement, this description may be somewhat inaccurate. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730, 738 (1983). Plain view provides grounds for seizure of an item when an officer's access to
an object has some prior justification under the Fourth Amendment. Id. Plain view is perhaps
better understood, therefore, not as an independent "exception" to the warrant clause, but simply
as an extension of whatever the prior justification for an officer's access to an object may be. Id.
at 738-39.
613 See, e.g., Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326; Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465.
69 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S.
765, 771 (1983) (no Fourth Amendment violation upon warrantless reopening of container,
where officer initially lawfully opened container and identified contents as illegal).
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and not an additional search, the plain view doctrine does not compro-
mise the individual interest in privacy; it merely deprives the individual
of his or her possessory interest in the property."
In 1971, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the United States Supreme
Court established the three basic criteria of the law regarding the plain
view doctrine.'' After a three week investigation into Coolidge's involve-
ment in a murder, police arrested Coolidge in his house and obtained
a warrant to search his car." Upon searching Coolidge's car, police
seized vacuum sweepings which, along with other evidence, were used
against Coolidge at trial." The jury found Coolidge guilty of murder."
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court first held that the
warrant authorizing the seizure and subsequent search of Coolidge's
car was invalid." The Court next addressed the State's argument that
the plain view doctrine justified a warrantless seizure and search of the
car." The Court reasoned that the legality of any plain view seizure
must rest on three criteria." First, the initial intrusion must be lawful."
According to the Court, the initial intrusion must be justified by a
warrant or by an exception to the warrant requirement." Second, the
discovery of the item must be inadvertent and not planned. 8° The
Court reasoned that this second requirement protects against general
exploratory searches conducted under the pretext of a plain view
search.81 Third, the grounds for seizure must be immediately apparent
to the police.82
Applying these requirements to the facts of the case, the Court
held that the plain view doctrine did not justify the police seizure of
Coolidge's car." The Court determined that the police knew the loca-
tion and description of the car well in advance, and intended to seize
7° See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128,133 (1990).
71 See 403 U.S. at 466,468-70.
72 Id. at 445-47.
10 1d. at 448.
74 Id.
75 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 449. The Court found that the warrant was not issued by a neutral
and detached magistrate, Id.
76 See id. at 464.
77 See id. at 466, 468-70.
78 See id. at 468.
79 See id. at 467.
" See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 469-70.
81 See id. at 470.
82 See id. at 466. The Court has interpreted this third requirement to mean that there must
be probable cause to associate the item seized with criminal activity. See Arizona v. Hicks, 980 U.S.
321, 326 (1987).
83 See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 472.
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the car when they came upon Coolidge's property." Thus, the Court
reasoned that the discovery of the car was not inadvertent." In addi-
don, the Court reasoned that the car was not contraband, stolen
property, or dangerous in and of itself. 86 Thus, the Court reasoned that
the illegal character of the car was not immediately apparent to the
police.87 The Court concluded that the seizure and subsequent search
of the car were unconstitutional, and the evidence obtained during the
search was improperly admitted at trial."
In 1987, in Arizona v. Hicks, the United States Supreme Court
provided guidance on the third requirement articulated in Coolidge--
the "immediately apparent" requirement. 89 The Court held that a po-
lice officer performed an unlawful search when he moved stolen stereo
equipment without probable cause to believe that the equipment was
stolen, in order to view its serial numbers. 9° Police officers lawfully
entered the defendant's apartment to search for evidence of a shoot-
ing.9 t While inside, one officer noticed two sets of expensive stereo
equipment in an otherwise ill-furnished apartment. 92 Suspecting that
the equipment was stolen, the officer moved some of the components
in order to read and record their serial numbers." The officer then
phoned in the numbers to police headquarters." Upon learning that
one of the components had been stolen in an armed robbery, the
officer seized it."
According to the Court, when the officer took action unrelated to
the objectives of the authorized intrusion, he further invaded the
defendant's privacy." The Court determined that moving the equip-
ment was unjustified by the circumstances that validated the initial
entry into the apartment. 97 The Court stressed that shifting the equip-
ment "even a few inches" constituted a search for which the officer





" See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 473.
1/9 See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325; see also David M. Scid, Note, The Aftermath of Arizona v. Hicks:
An Expectation of Privacy at Home, 17 Asti. Cam. L. 81, 88-89 (1989).
° See Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987).





 Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323.
96 See id. at 324-25.
97 See id. at 325.
98 Id.
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criminating nature of the stereo equipment was not immediately ap-
parent, the officer's action resulted in an invasion of the defendant's
privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstance that validated the entry. 99
In 1990, in Horton v. California, the United States Supreme Court
rejected the Coolidge inadvertence requirement."' In Horton, the police
developed probable cause to search Horton's home for the proceeds
of a robbery, and for the weapons used in the robbery.'° 1 In applying
for a search warrant to a magistrate, the officer submitted an affidavit
mentioning both the robbery proceeds and the weaponsi° 2 The war-
rant issued by the magistrate, however, mentioned only the stolen
property. 10" When executing the warrant, the officer did not discover
the stolen property, but he did discover the weapons in plain sight)"
The officer later testified that he was interested in finding other evi-
dence during the search for stolen property.w5 Thus, he did not dis-
cover the evidence "inadvertently." 1 °6 Nevertheless, the Court denied
Horton's motion to suppress, and he was convicted of armed rob-
bery. 1 °7
In determining that the inadvertence requirement was unneces-
sary, the Court reasoned that the requirement acids nothing to the
protection of an individual's right to privacy.'" First, the Court deter-
mined that evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the appli-
cation of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that
depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer. 1 °9 Second, the
Court reasoned that the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment already serves to prevent the police from conducting general or
pretextual searches, and thus the inadvertence requirement is unnec-
essary."° According to the Court, if the scope of the search exceeds
either the terms of a valid warrant or the permissible limits of a
warrantless search, any subsequent seizure is unconstitutional, regard-
99 See id. at 329-25.
1°°996 U.S. 128, 130 (1990).
1 ° 1 Id. at 130-31.
102 1d. at 131.
"3 1d.
109
1 °5 Horton, 496 U.S. at 131.
105m .
1 °7 /d. at 130, 131.
108 See id. at 139-140.
1 °9
 Id. at 138.
110 See Horton, 496 U.S. at 139-40. The Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant describe
with particularity "the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONS'''.
amend. IV. This limitation safeguards the individual's privacy interest against "the wide-ranging
exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit." Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84
(1987).
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less of the existence of the inadvertence requirement. 1 " On the other
hand, if the scope of the search is lawful, the Court reasoned that the
government has already invaded the individual's interest in privacy,
and thus no additional right against seizure is required other than the
"immediately apparent" requirement.''' The Court concluded that the
plain view doctrine authorized the seizure, even though discovery of
the evidence was not inadvertent."'
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented in Horton."4
According to Justice Brennan, the majority, in eschewing the inadver-
tence requirement, ignored the Fourth Amendment's express command
that warrants particularly describe not only the places to be searched,
but also the items to be seized." 5 The dissent stressed that the Fourth
Amendment protects both privacy interests and possessory interests." 6
While conceding that the inadvertence requirement does not further
any privacy interests, the dissent reasoned that the requirement does
protect possessory interests."' Thus, the dissent reasoned that by elimi-
nating the inadvertence requirement, the majority modified the Fourth
Amendment to give preference to privacy interests over possessory
interestsm—a result contrary to both the express terms and recent
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment." 9
In sum, the plain view doctrine permits an officer to make a
warrantless seizure of incriminating items that the officer discovers
while engaged in an otherwise lawful search, as long as the incriminat-
ing nature of the items is immediately apparent to the officer.'" The
doctrine does not permit a search, but only a seizure of an item already
discovered.' 2 ' The rationale of the plain view doctrine is that an indi-
vidual can have no legitimate expectation of privacy in items that the
individual has left open to view.' 22 Although Horton rejected the inad-
11 See Horton, 496 U.S. at 140.
112 See id. at 136, 141-42.
113 See id. at 130, 142.
114 Id. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15 1d. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116 Horton, 496 U.S. at 143 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 147 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119 See id. at 143 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Arizona v. Hicks, the Supreme Court stated:
"[a]lthough the interest protected by the Fourth Amendment injunction against unreasonable
searches is quite different from that protected by its injunction against unreasonable seizures,
neither the one nor the other is of inferior worth or necessarily requires only lesser protection."
480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987).
120 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136-37 (1993).
121 See
122 See id. at 2137.
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vertence requirement originally articulated in Coolidge, the remainder
of the plain view doctrine remains firmly entrenched in Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence."'
C. The Plain Feel Corollary
The plain feel exception to the warrant requirement evolved as a
corollary to the plain view doctrine.'" The plain feel doctrine provides
that when an officer feels an object in the course of a Terry stop, and
this touching provides probable cause for a further search or seizure,
the further intrusion need not be authorized by a warrant.'" Although
most state and federal courts recognized this exception prior to the
United States Supreme Court decision in Dickerson, some state courts
have rejected the plain feel corollary.' 26
Courts that have adopted the plain feel doctrine reason that a law
enforcement officer should be able to use all of his or her senses in
the determination of whether probable cause exists.' 27 For example, in
1987, in United States v. Williams, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit expressly adopted the plain feel
doctrine.'" The court held that a police officer who, upon touching a
paper bag immediately realized that it contained contraband, justifiably
seized that bag."' In Williams, four narcotics officers traveling in an
unmarked van observed Williams and two other individuals seated in
123 See id. at 2136-37; Horton, 496 U.S. at 130.
124 See David L. Haselkorn, Comment, The Case Against a Plain Feel Exception to the Warrant
Requirement, 54 U. Ctn. L. Rev. 685, 683 (1987).
125 Haselkorn, supra note 124, at 683.
128 Compare United States v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir. 1992) (seizure of pouch
containing weapon during valid automobile search justified under plain feel doctrine) and
United States v. Buchannon, 878 F.2d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 1989) (seizure of cocaine during valid
patdown search justified under plain feel doctrine) and United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174,
1184-86 (D,C. Cir. 1987) (seizure of bag containing contraband during patdown search justified
under plain feel doctrine) and People v. Chavers, 658 P.2d 96, 102 (Cal. 1983) (seizure of weapon
in opaque shaving kit during valid automobile search justified under plain feel doctrine) and
State v. Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311, 317 (Wis. 1992) (seizure of bag containing cocaine during lawful
patdown search justified under plain feel doctrine), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3020 (1993) with State
v. Collins, 679 P.2d 80, 81-82 (Ariz. CL App. 1983) (seizure of objects that were obviously not
weapons violates Fourth Amendment; no plain feel exception to Fourth Amendment exists) and
People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 301 (N.Y. 1993) (plain feel exception is contrary to both state
and federal constitutions) and State v. Rhodes, 788 P.2d 1380, 1381 (Okla, Crim. App. 1990)
(officer not justified in seizing object that he felt in course of patdown search unless object
reasonably resembles weapon) and State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 102 (Wash. 1982) (soft bulge
in defendant's shirt pocket was not itself sufficient information to find probable cause).
127 See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 437 S.E.2d 387, 390 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
128 822 F.2d at 1184.
128 /d. at 1177, 1184.
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a parked automobile.'" The officers observed that Williams and his
front seat passenger were "bent over" and apparently concentrating on
"something in their laps." 131 Based on their experience investigating
narcotics offenses and the fact that the car was parked in an area
known for extensive drug use, the officers suspected a narcotics viola-
tion.'" As two of the officers approached the van, they saw Williams
shove a "brown object" or "paper bag" underneath his leg.'" Believing
that the bag might contain a weapon, one officer asked Williams to
step out of the car.' 34 As Williams began to step out, he put his right
hand under his leg and attempted, unsuccessfully, to throw the bag
into the back seat of the car.'" At that point, the officer picked up the
bag and felt it with both hands.'" According to the officer, when he
touched the bag, he could "feel that inside were numerous small
rolled-up objects" that "felt like plastic baggies."' 37 Based on this touch-
ing and his experience and training in narcotics detection, the officer
believed that the bag contained "numerous quarter bags of heroin."'"
Upon opening the bag, the officer found five large bags with forty-four
small bags containing heroin.'" He then placed Williams under ar-
rest."° The district court judge trying the case admitted the evidence."'
Williams was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute. 142
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit upheld the warrantless seizure of the
heroin based on a plain feel principle. 143 The court, however, estab-
lished three limitations to the principle. 144 First, the court noted that
the plain feel doctrine applies only when an officer may legally touch
the container in the first place. 145 The court reasoned that the officer's
fear that the bag contained a weapon justified the officer in touching
the bag. 146 Second, the touching must be limited to that justified by the
' 3° Id. at 1176 ,
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Williams, 822 F.2d at 1176.





 Williams, 822 F.2d at 1177.
148 Id.
141 Id. at 1176.
142 1d. at 1175-76.
143 Williams, 822 F.2d at 1184.
144 ,rd,
143 Id.
146 1d. at 1179-80.
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initial contact with the object. 147 The court noted that nothing in the
record established that the officer continued to manipulate the con-
tainer after the absence of a weapon became apparent.'" Third, the
touching must convince the officer, to a reasonable certainty, that the
felt object is contraband or evidence of a crime.'" The court reasoned
that the specificity of the officer's determination of the bag's contents,
along with the officer's training and experience in the area, supported
the conclusion that the officer was reasonably certain that the bag
contained contraband. 15° Thus, the court upheld the warrantless sei-
zure of the contraband, and the lower court's denial of the motion to
suppress the evidence.'''
Courts that have declined to extend the plain view doctrine to the
sense of touch reason that the sense of touch is inherently less imme-
diate and less reliable than the sense of sight, and is far more intrusive
into the personal privacy that lies at the core of the Fourth Amend-
ment.' 52 For example, in 1993, in People v. Diaz, the Court of Appeals
of New York rejected the plain feel exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment warrant requirement.'" While on patrol, two officers observed
several groups congregating on the sidewalks, apparently passing ob-
jects from hand to hand. 154 The officers further observed Diaz at various
times at the center of several of these groups.'" The officers became
suspicious when Diaz walked away from them as their squad car ap-
proached.'" The officers drove alongside Diaz and called him over to
the car.' 57 In walking toward the car, Diaz repeatedly placed his hand
in his pocket, despite the officers' warnings against doing so.'" As Diaz
reached the car, one of the officers noticed a bulge in Diaz's pocket
147 M. at 1184.
148 Williams, 822 F.2d at 1186.
149 Id. at 1184. According to the court, this third limitation distinguishes a plain feel analysis
from a plain view analysis. Id. Unlike plain view, where probable cause—a predictive judgment
that further investigation will yield particular results—suffices to exempt the seizure front Fourth
Amendment warrant requirements, the information gleaned in plain feel must be good enough
to eliminate all need for additional search activity. Id. at 1184-85. This can only occur when
sensory information acquired by the officer rises to a state of certitude, rather than mere
prediction, in regard to the object of the investigation. Id. at 1185.
ir't) See id. at 1185, 1186.
151 /d. at 1186.
L52 See, e.g., State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Minn. 1992) [hereinafter Dickerson hi,
affd, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993); People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 301-02
(N.Y. 1993).
158 Diaz, 612 N.E.2d at 301.




158 Diaz, 612 N.E.2d at 299.
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and again told Diaz to remove his hand.'" Fearing a weapon, the
officer grabbed Diaz's pocket. 16° He felt no weapon, but did detect what
"appeared to be a bunch of vials."' 6 ' Diaz attempted to flee, but the
officer grabbed him, reached into Diaz's pocket, and removed eight-
een vials of crack cocaine.'" The officers then placed Diaz under
arrest.'" At trial, the court granted Diaz's motion to suppress.'" The
Appellate Division reversed and denied the motion. 166 Contrary to the
trial court, the appellate court found reasonable suspicion to justify
the stop and patdown. 1 " Diaz then appealed the ruling of the Appel-
late Division.'"
The New York Court of Appeals held in favor of Diaz, and refused
to recognize a plain feel doctrine. 168 According to the court, an owner
holds no expectation of privacy for an object in plain view.'" When an
owner conceals an object by clothing or other covering, however, that
owner retains a legitimate expectation that the item's existence and
characteristics will remain private."° Although in most instances seeing
an object will instantly reveal its identity and nature, the court reasoned
that touching an object is inherently less reliable and cannot conclu-
sively establish an object's identity or criminal nature.'" Moreover, the
court noted, in drawing conclusions as to the nature of an object by
feeling it through an exterior covering, the police officer relies solely
on expert opinion that cannot be equated with information obtained
by seeing the object. 172 The court also feared that a plain feel doctrine
would invite the use of weapon searches as a pretext for unwarranted
searches, thus severely eroding the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment."' The court concluded, therefore, that the claimed analogy of




162 Id. at 299-300.





166 Diaz, 612 N.E.2d at 301.
t 69 Id.
170 1d .
171 Id. at 302.
172 1d.
173 Diaz, 612 N.E.2d at 302.
179 Id. at 301.
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II. THE DICKERSON DECISION
In 1993, in Dickerson, the United States Supreme Court explicitly
recognized a plain feel exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement.'" The Court ruled unanimously that when a law enforce-
ment officer conducting a lawful protective patdown search detects, by
feel, something other than a weapon, he or she may seize it without a
warrant if the officer's sense of touch makes it immediately apparent
that the felt object is contraband. 17" The Court justified its holding by
analogizing to the plain view doctrine."7
On November 9, 1989, Minneapolis police officers Vernon Rose
and Bruce Johnson were patrolling an area on the city's north side,
when Officer Rose spotted the defendant, Timothy Dickerson, leaving
a twelve-unit apartment building. 18 Officer Rose, having previously
responded to complaints of drug activity in the building's hallways,
considered the building to be a "crack house."'" Officer Rose testified
that Dickerson began walking toward him but, upon spotting the squad
car and making eye contact with Rose, abruptly halted and began
walking in the opposite direction.'s° Based upon Dickerson's seemingly
evasive actions and the fact that he had just left a building known for
cocaine traffic, the officers decided to stop Dickerson and investigate
further.' 81
176 See Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
176 Id. In the facts of this case, however, the Court held that the search exceeded the bounds
of Terry because the search was not limited to that which was necessary for the discovery of
weapons. Id. at 2139. Three Justices, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed on the
adoption of a plain feel doctrine, but would have remanded the case in order to further examine
whether the frisk exceeded that authorized by Terry. Id. at 2141 (Rehnquist, CT, concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
177 ./d. at 2139.
I78 State v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 462, 463-64 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) [hereinafter Dickerson
I], affd, Dickerson II, 481 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1992), affd, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 115 S. Ct. 2150
(1993).
179 /d. at 464. For a description of a "crack house," see Scott Minerbrook, A Night in a Crack
House, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 10, 1989, at 29 ("[T]he term crack house can mean
different things—a place to use [crack cocaine], a place to sell [crack cocaine] or a place to do
both, and the location may be an apartment, bungalow or abandoned building. If the focus is
on sales, the crack house often has iron bars on the windows, steel plating on the door and
lookouts prowling nearby. The [crack cocaine] is passed through slots in windows or doors.
Efficient operations clear $10,000 a day. Customers without cash try to barter televisions, jewelry
or guns for one more rock [of crack cocaine]. Women frequently 'work a twise—trade sex for
crack.").
18° Dickerson I, 469 N.W.2d at 464.
181 Id.
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The officers ordered Dickerson to submit to a patdown search: 82
Although the search revealed no weapons, Officer Rose felt a small
lump through Dickerson's nylon jacket.'" Officer Rose later testified:
"[Ns I pat-searched the front of his body, I felt a lump, a small lump,
in the front pocket. I examined it with my fingers and it slid and it felt
to be a lump of crack cocaine in cellophane." 184 Officer Rose then
reached into Dickerson's pocket and retrieved a small plastic bag
containing one-fifth of one gram of crack cocaine: 85 The officers ar-
rested Dickerson and charged him with possession of a controlled
substance:86
The Minnesota trial court denied Dickerson's motion to suppress
the cocaine: 87
 First, the court concluded that Terry justified the officers
in stopping Dickerson and frisking him to ensure that he was not
carrying a weapon: 88 Next, the court, analogizing to the plain view
doctrine, determined that seizure of the cocaine did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.' 89 The court reasoned that the sense of touch, to
an experienced officer, is as reliable as perceptions drawn from other
senses.' 9° The court thus admitted the cocaine and found Dickerson
guilty of possession of a controlled substance.' 9 '
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota reversed.' 92 Although the
court agreed with the trial court that Terry authorized the investigative
stop and protective patdown search of Dickerson, it concluded that the
officers overstepped the bounds allowed by Terry in seizing the co-
caine.'" In addition, the appeals court specifically refused to adopt the
plain feel exception to the warrant requirement.' 94
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the plain feel exception
and agreed with the court of appeals, holding that the officer was not
privileged to manipulate the object to determine its identity: 95 First,
' 8'2 Id.
185 1d.
181 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2133.
185 Id. at 2133-34.
186 Id. at 2134.
187 Id.
1 " Id.
I "Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2134.
19(1 Id.
191 Id.
192 Dickerson 1, 469 N.W.2d at 467.
193 Id. at 965.
'° Id. at 966.
I 95 Ditkerson II, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843-44, 846 (Minn. 1992).
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the court held the stop valid, reasoning that Dickerson's evasive con-
duct, combined with his departure from a building with a history of
drug activity, justified police in reasonably suspecting criminal activ-
ity.'" In addition, the court held that the officers were justified in
performing the patdown search, based on Dickerson's suspicious be-
havior and Officer Rose's personal experience in seizing guns from the
building that Dickerson just left.' 97
The Minnesota Supreme Court held, however, that the officer
exceeded the scope of a Terry search by continuing to feel the lump
in Dickerson's jacket after ascertaining that it was not a weapon. 1 J" In
addition, the court refused to recognize a plain feel exception to the
warrant requirement, noting that neither the Minnesota Supreme Court
nor the United States Supreme Court had ever acknowledged such an
exception.'" In rejecting the analogy to the plain view doctrine, the
court reasoned that the senses of sight and touch are not equivalent."°
First, the court observed that the sense of touch is inherently less
immediate and less reliable than the sense of sight."' Second, and
more importantly, the court reasoned that the sense of touch is far
more intrusive into the personal privacy that is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment, because it involves physical touching.202 In addi-
tion, the court stated that even if it did recognize a plain feel exception,
the search in this case would not qualify, because the officers conduct-
ing the patdown search never gained probable cause to justify the more
extensive search they performed."3 Thus, the majority held in favor of
the defendant, affirming the reversal of Dickerson's conviction. 204
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict among the state and federal courts concerning the existence
of the plain feel exception."' The Court held that contraband detected
through the sense of touch during a patdown search may be admitted
into evidence, so long as the search was within the bounds marked by
Terry. 206 Under the facts of the case, however, the Court determined
196 /d. at 843.
197 id.
M id. at 846.
199 Id. at 84344.
20° Dickerson II, 481 N.W.2d at 845.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 1d. at 844 n.l, 846.
204 Id. at 846.
205 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2134.
2uli Id. at 2136.
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that the search of Dickerson's jacket exceeded the lawful bounds marked
by Terry, and therefore held in favor of Dickerson.2°7
The Court began its opinion by reasoning that Terry opened the
door for adoption of the plain feel doctrine. 2°9 Under Terry, an officer
may conduct a patdown search and seize a suspected weapon if per-
ceived through the officer's sense of touch. 209 The Court reasoned that
an officer should not be required to ignore any contraband discovered
while conducting a legitimate Terry search.21 °
The Court then analogized to the plain view doctrine, reasoning that
the warrantless seizure of contraband detected through an officer's
sense of touch is justified by the realization that resort to a neutral
magistrate in order to obtain a warrant would often be impracticable
and would do little to promote the objectives of the Fourth Amend-
ment. 2 " According to the Court, because items in open view are ob-
served by an officer from a lawful vantage point, there is no invasion
of a legitimate expectation of privacy. 212 Thus, no "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred when an officer
makes a plain view seizure.'" Similarly, the Court reasoned that if an
officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object
whose contour makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been
no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by
the officer's search for weapons.'"
In rejecting the position of the Minnesota Supreme Court that the
sense of touch is inherently less immediate and less reliable than the
sense of sight, the Court noted that the Terry decision itself demon-
strates that the sense of touch is capable of revealing the nature of an
object with sufficient reliability to support its seizure. 2' 5 The Court
further stated that any argument that the sense of touch was less reli-
able than the sense of sight would only suggest that the officers would
less often be able to justify seizures of unseen contraband. 216 The Court
reasoned that the Fourth Amendment's requirement that the officer
have probable cause to believe that an item is contraband before
207 1d. at 2139.
20B See id. at 2136.
200 See id. See supra notes 50-66 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of
the Supreme Court's holding in Terry.
210 See Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2136.
211




215 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
216 Id.
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seizing it would protect against excessively speculative seizures. 217 The
Court also rejected the Minnesota Supreme Court's concern that touch
intrudes more into privacy than sight. 2 ' 8 The Court reasoned that this
feared intrusion had already been authorized by the lawful search for
weapons, and that the seizure of an item whose identity is already
known does not constitute a further invasion of privacy. 219
In applying these principles to the facts, the Dickerson Court relied
on the conclusion of the Minnesota District Court that Officer Rose
"never thought the lump was a weapon," and determined the lump to
be contraband only after "squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulat-
ing the contents of the defendant's pocket.""° The Court noted that
the Minnesota trial court never made precise findings as to whether
Officer Rose acted within the lawful bounds marked by Terry at the
time he gained probable cause to believe that Dickerson's jacket con-
tained contraband."' The Court nevertheless held that the officer
overstepped the bounds of the strictly circumscribed search for weap-
ons allowed under Terry. 222 The Court reasoned that the officer's con-
tinued exploration of Dickerson's pocket, after he concluded that it
contained no weapon, was unrelated to the sole justification of the
search under Terry—the protection of the police officer and others
nearby. 223 The Court analogized to Arizona v. Hicks, in which the police,
while lawfully searching the defendant's apartment for weapons, ob-
tained probable cause to believe that stereo equipment, in plain view,
was contraband, only after moving the equipment in order to read its
serial numbers. 224 Because probable cause to believe that the equip-
ment was stolen arose only as a result of a further search, the Court in
that case held the evidence properly inadrnissible. 225 Similarly, the Court
reasoned that although Officer Rose was lawfully in a position to feel
the lump in Dickerson's pocket, the incriminating character of the
object was not immediately apparent to him. 226 Thus, the Court con-
cluded, although Terry entitled Officer Rose to place his hands upon
Dickerson's jacket, neither Terry nor any other exception to the war-
217 Id.
216 Id. at 2137-38.
219 Id. at 2138.
22° Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2138.
' Id.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 2138-39.
224 1d. at 2139; Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987).
225 Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326, 329.
226 Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2139.
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rant requirement authorized the search. 227 Accordingly, the Court held
in favor of Dickerson. 228
In sum, the majority in Dickerson unanimously held that when a
law enforcement officer, while conducting a lawful frisk, detects by feel
something other than a weapon, the officer may seize the object with-
out a warrant if the officer's sense of touch makes it immediately
apparent that the felt object is contraband."' The Court held, however,
that the frisk must remain within the bounds of the weapons frisk
permitted by Terry."° Accordingly, the object must be immediately
identifiable as contraband in order to be subject to seizure."' Because
the case at issue did not meet this standard, the Court held the search
and seizure unlawful." 2
III. POST-DICKERSON DECISIONS
Since Dickerson, a number of courts have had the opportunity to
consider the plain feel doctrine. 238 Several of these cases have helped
227 /d. Justice Scalia, in a separate concurring opinion, questioned whether the physical
search—the "frisk" portion of the Terry "stop-and-frisk"—is a proper interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Noting that there is no precedent in common law for
searching persons who are not yet under arrest, Justice Scalia doubted whether the Framers of
the Constitution would have allowed themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion of being
armed and dangerous, to the indignity of such a search. Id. at 2140 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Recognizing that constitutionality of the "frisk" in the present case was neither challenged nor
argued, however, Justice Scalia agreed with the Court's premise that any evidence incidentally
discovered in the course of the search would be admissible. Id. at 2141 (Scalia, J., concurring).
228 Id. at 2139. Chief Justice Rehnquist,joined by Justices Blackmun and Thomas, concurred
in part and dissented in part. Id. at 2141 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The Chief Justice agreed on the adoption of a plain feel doctrine, but would have vacated
the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court and remanded the case to that court for further
proceedings. Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Chief Justice
noted that the state trial court made no precise findings as to the dispositive issue of whether the
officer who conducted the search was acting within the lawful bounds marked by Terry. Id.
(Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, because the state supreme
court employed a Fourth Amendment analysis differing significantly from that adopted by the
Court, the Chief Justice would vacate its judgment and remand the case for further proceedings
on the question as to when, during the course of the search, Officer Rose developed probable
cause to believe that the lump constituted contraband. Id. (Rehnquist, CI, concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
229 1d, at 2137.
23° Id. at 2139.




of these courts have concluded that the seizure of contraband did not meet the
"immediately apparent" requirement of the plain feel doctrine, or that the arresting officer
overstepped the bounds of Terry while performing the patdown search. See United States v.
Schiavo, 29 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Gibson, 19 F.3d 1449, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
United States v. Ponce, 8 Fid 989, 999 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551,
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define the "immediately apparent" requirement of the plain feel doc-
trine in situations where the felt object was not itself contraband. 234 For
example, in 1993, in United States v. Ross, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama held that seizure of a
matchbox containing cocaine during a patdown search was illegal,
because the matchbox itself could not be immediately recognizable as
contraband.2" While performing a patdown search of the defendant,
the officer felt a small box tucked in the defendant's groin, which the
officer immediately identified as a hollow matchbox. 236 Based on the
location of the matchbox in the groin area, the officer immediately
suspected that the box contained hidden contraband. 237 The govern-
ment argued that the officer's informed "suspicion" met the "immedi-
ately apparent" requirement of Dickerson. 238 The court reasoned that
such a construction would contort the holding of Dickerson. 2" Because
the officer believed only that the box contained contraband, and not
that the box was itself contraband, the court reasoned that its illegal
1554 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Mitchell, 832 F. Supp. 1073, 1079 (N,D, Miss. 1993); United
States v. Ross, 827 F. Supp. 711, 719 (S.D. Ala. 1993), affd, 19 F,3d 1446 (11th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Winter, 826 F. Supp. 33, 37-38 (D. Mass. 1993), affd  on other grounds, 22 F.3(1 15 (1st
Cir. 1994); People v. Dickey, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 46 (Cal. Ct, App. 1994); People v. Corpany, 859
P.2d 865, 871 (Colo. 1993); Hicks v. State, 631 A.2d 6, 11 (Del. 1993); Howard v. State, 623 So.
2d 1240, 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Sian, 624 So, 2d 451, 452 (La. Ct. App. 1993),
rev'd on other grounds, 632 So. 2d 749 (La, 1994); State v. Parker, 622 So. 2d 791, 795 (La. Ct.
App. 1993); People v. Champion, 518 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Beveridge,
436 S.E.2d 912, 916 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993), affd, 444 S.E.2d 223 (N.C. 1994) (per curiatn); State
v. Cloud, 632 N.E.2c1 932, 935 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); In re S.D., 633 A.2d 172, 1 76-7 7 (Pa. Super.
Ct, 1993); Campbell v. State, 864 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Tzintzun-Jimenez,
866 P.2d 667, 670 (Wash. 1994). A number of courts, however, have concluded that the patdown
search and ultimate seizure of contraband were proper under the plain feel doctrine recognized
in Dickerson. See. United States v. Hughes, 15 F.3d 798, 802 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Brown,
No. 93-378(14L), 1994 WL 380695, at *6 (D.P.R. May 20, 1994); Harris v. State, No. 92-1325,
1994 WL 267926, at *I (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 20, 1994); People v. Mitchell, 630 N.E,2d 451,
453 {Ill. App, Ct. 1993); State v. Wilson, 437 S.E.2d 387, 390 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); State v.
Sandford, No. 66275, 1994 WL 463846, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1994); Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 631 A.2d 1335, 1340-41 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); State v. Kersh, No. 94-1351-CR, 1994 WL
425196, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 1994); State v. Buchanan, 504 N.W.2d 400, 404 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1993).
234 See Ross, 827 F. Supp. at 719 (matchbox containing crack cocaine was not immediately
apparent); Parker, 622 So. 2d at 795 (matchbox containing rocks of cocaine was not immediately
apparent); Champion, 518 N.W.2d at 521 (pill bottle containing cocaine was not immediately
apparent); Campbell, 864 S.W.2d at 226 (film canister and vial containing cocaine were not
immediately apparent).
235 Ross, 827 F. Stipp, at 719; see also Champion, 538 N.W.2d at 521 (impossible for officer to
conclude that the incriminating nature of a pill bottle was immediately apparent).
233 Ross, 827 F. Stipp, at 713.
237 /d. at 714.
233 Id. at 719.
235 Id.
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nature could not be immediately apparent. 24° The court emphasized
that the only way the officer could have verified his suspicions concern-
ing the contents of the box was by removing the box and looking
inside.241 According to the court, Dickerson does not allow such ac-
tion.242 Thus, the court concluded that the officer illegally seized the
cocaine.24s
Even in situations where an officer feels contraband itself and
claims that its illegal nature was immediately apparent, a court still may
discredit the officer's testimony and invalidate the seizure. 244 For ex-
ample, in 1993, in United States v. Mitchell, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Mississippi held that the plain feel
doctrine did not justify a warrantless seizure of a bag in the defendant's
pocket, despite testimony that crack cocaine was immediately apparent
to the officers upon patting the defendant.245 The crack cocaine re-
moved from the defendant was contained in six plastic bags, which
were wrapped in a sock.246 The sock was in a brown paper bag, which
the defendant carried in the pocket of a dense, heavy grade, leather
jacket with lined pockets. 247 Based on this information, the court was
not convinced that an immediately apparent determination of contra-
band was "within the realm of human capability with a single pass of
one's hand over the outer clothing."248 The court concluded that,
under the facts of this case, the police exceeded the limits of a Terry
search.249
In many cases, however, courts have upheld seizures of contraband
detected during patdown searches, relying on the officer's testimony. 25°
240 Id. The court noted that the holding might have been different if the defendant had been
carrying the cocaine simply in a plastic bag in his pelvic area, through which the contours or
mass of contraband could be sensed. Id. at 719 n.15.
241 Ross, 827 F. Supp. at 719.
242 Id.
243 /d. In a factually similar case, the Court of Appeals of Texas, although holding that a film
canister containing cocaine was not immediately apparent, suggested that seizure may be appro-
priate under certain circumstances. See Campbell v. State, 864 S,W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. CL App.
1993) (seizure may have been appropriate if officer had viewed drug paraphernalia, which might
have given the officer probable cause to believe that the defendant was concealing contraband).





249 Mitchell, 832 F. Supp. at 1078.
23° See United States v. Hughes. 15 F.3d 798, 802 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Brown, No.
93-378(HL), 1994 WL 380695, at *6 (D.P.R.• May 20, 1994); Harris v. State, No. 92-1325, 1994
WL 267926, at *1 (Fla. Dist. CL App. June 20, 1994); People v. Mitchell, 630 N.E.2d 451, 453 (111.
App. Ct. 1993); State v. Wilson, 437 S,E.2d 387, 390 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Sandford, No.
66275, 1994 WL 463846, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1994); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 631
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In 1993, in State v. Wilson, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina held
that the officer's search of the defendant was no more intrusive than
necessary, because the incriminating character of the lump in the
defendant's jacket pocket was immediately apparent to the officer. 25 '
While performing a protective frisk, a police officer felt a lump in the
breast pocket of the defendant's jacket, which he immediately deter-
mined to be crack cocaine.252 Distinguishing this case from Dickerson,
the court noted the absence of any testimony that the officer in this
case manipulated the contents of the defendant's pocket, or that he
performed a search impermissible under Terry. 255 The court concluded
that the officer, upon using his tactile senses, had the requisite prob-
able cause to believe that the lump in the defendant's pocket was
cocaine.254 Thus, the court held that the cocaine was admissible. 255
Unconditional reliance on an officer's testimony, however, can
lead to absurd results. 256 For example, in 1994, in United States v. Brown,
the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico upheld
the seizure of two packages containing cocaine. 257 The packages were
wrapped in black tape and hidden under the defendant's clothing. 258
The officer who conducted the patdown search testified that the illegal
nature of the contraband was immediately apparent to him when he
touched the defendant's midsection. 259 Despite the fact that the pack-
ages were wrapped in tape, the court accepted the officer's testimony
that their illegal nature was immediately apparent. 26° Thus, the court
concluded that the seizure was justified. 261
IV. DICKERSON: ITS FLAWS AND POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE
The Wilson case, and the introductory hypothetical regarding an
officer's search of a paranoid schizophrenic, illustrate the ambiguous
A.2d 1335, 1340-41 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); State v. Kersh, No. 94-1351-CR, 1994 WL 425196, at
*2 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 1994); State v. Buchanan, 504 N.W.2d 400, 404 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
251 437 S.E.2d at 390.
252 Id. at 387.
255 Id. at 389.
254 Id. at 390. The court's conclusion was based on the officer's experience in making drug
arrests during his seven years of service, and on the fact that the officer was called to the scene
to investigate alleged drug dealings. Id.
255 Id.
256 United States v. Brown, No. 93-378(HL), 1994 WL 380695, at *6 (D.P.R. May 20, 1994).
257 id.
258 /d. at *1.
259 Id. at *6.
26" Id.
261 Brown, No. 93-378(HL), 1994 WI. 380695, at *6.
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nature of the plain feel doctrine. 262 The principal difference between
the two fact patterns is that the defendant was guilty in the former, and
innocent in the latter. Though society's concern for the rights of guilty
defendants is low, the Court must recognize that the Dickerson decision
could mean far more intrusive searches of innocent individuals. The
Court's decision in Dickerson can be criticized on three grounds. First,
the Court's reasoning is flawed based on existing Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Second, the Court did not consider the practical impli-
cations of the Dickerson decision, and thus has turned its back on
reality. Finally, the existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, upon
which Dickerson relies, is itself in need of repair.
A ; Internal Weaknesses
The Court's reasoning in Dickerson is internally flawed based on
existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First, the Court ignores
the dominant objective of the Terry stop—protection of police officers
and the surrounding community. Because weapons are the only proper
objects of a protective search, only weapons should be admissible into
evidence. The exclusionary rule should be employed vigorously to
achieve the Fourth Amendment's regulatory objective by reducing
undesirable incentives to perform unconstitutional searches and sei-
zures. 263 The risk is great that the plain feel doctrine will lead to far
more intrusive, if not pretextual, searches. In order to reduce this risk
of police misconduct, the exclusionary rule should apply to prevent
police from introducing contraband other than weapons.
The rationale underlying the plain view doctrine is inapplicable
in the context of plain feel. The primary justification for allowing the
seizure of items in plain view is that the defendant has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in those items that he or she left open to view. 264
Thus, the governmental interest in law enforcement outweighs the
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests. 265
In contrast, an individual has a heightened expectation of privacy
in concealed items. This increased privacy interest is evidenced by the
further steps taken by the individual in order to hide the item from
view. Thus, unlike items in plain view, the individual's Fourth Amend-
ment interests in items detected through plain feel may outweigh the
2" See State v. Wilson, 437 S.E.2d 387, 390 (N.C. CL App. 1993).
263 See Anthony C. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349,
437-38 (1974).
264 See Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
263 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983).
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government's interest in effective law enforcement. In adopting the
plain feel doctrine, however, the Dickerson Court never performed an
independent balancing test. 266 Rather, the Court merely applied by
analogy the plain view rationale to plain feel. 267 Such an analysis im-
properly equates the differing privacy expectations inherent in objects
left open to view and objects concealed from view.
Finally, the warrantless seizure of objects in plain feel may be
unnecessary to protect the government's interest in preserving evi-
dence. At least one commentator has suggested that a suspect will less
likely destroy evidence detected by touch while a warrant is being
procured than evidence detected by sight. 268 One premise underlying
the need for an officer to make a warrantless seizure of an item in plain
view is that without such a seizure, the evidence may be destroyed. 269
Obviously, a suspect who knows that a law enforcement officer has seen
incriminating evidence will more likely destroy that evidence. A suspect
who has been subject to a patdown search, however, may not even
realize that the officer discovered incriminating evidence through his
or her sense of touch.27° Thus, one of the justifications for the plain
view doctrine may be inapplicable in the context of plain feel.
B. Practical Weaknesses
Ignoring the internal weaknesses of Dickerson discussed above, the
decision also is lacking from a practical standpoint. Pragmatically, the
Dickerson decision constitutes a double dilution of the warrant require-
ment. Terry already allows for warrantless searches based on less than
probable cause. Because protective searches are not supported by
probable cause, the Terry Court carefully limited the scope of the
search to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons. By not
requiring the officer to specifically identify the felt object, the Terry
Court intended to minimize the intrusion."' Thus, the decision was
based on the premise that the feel of a weapon, which is usually very
hard and somewhat sizable, would undoubtedly be apparent to an
officer who merely patted down a suspect.
266 Generally, the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balanc-
ing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legiti-
mate governmental interests. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
267 See Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
268 See Haselkorn, supra note 124, at 697.
269 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480'U.S, 321, 327 (1987).
270 See Haselkorn, supra note 124, at 697.
271 Rather than specifically identifying the felt object, the officer merely must determine
whether the object is, or is not, a weapon. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
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This fundamental premise fails for most items of contraband. The
varying physical characteristics of contraband make it virtually impos-
sible for an officer to immediately ascertain the criminal nature of the
substance, given the more cursory treatment of a patdown search. 272
Thus, in theory, Dickerson protects the individual because the Court
requires an officer to have probable cause before seizing an object or
conducting a more extensive search. In practice, however, an officer
could not possibly gain probable cause from the mere touching of an
object through clothing. Indeed, the viewing of an object of contra-
band will very often be insufficient to give rise to probable cause,
because the illegal nature of the object may not be immediately appar-
ent.2" Touching in the context of a protective search is inherently less
reliable than viewing. While a law enforcement officer normally would
view the contraband itself, he or she could only touch it through
clothing. In addition, the identification of an object detected through
the sense of touch is open to a wider range of interpretation than if
detected through the sense of sight. Thus, as illustrated in the intro-
ductory hypothetical, the plain feel doctrine in the context of a cursory
patdown search has great potential for error.
This potential for misinterpretation, along with a zealous police
officer's desire to establish probable cause to justify a seizure, will
inevitably lead to more intrusive searches than permitted by Terry.
Moreover, to approve the use of evidence of some offense unrelated
to weapons would be to invite the use of weapon searches as a pretext
for unwarranted searches, and thus to severely erode the protection of
the Fourth Amendment. 274 Police officers will likely succeed in convinc-
ing a court—which has incriminating evidence in front of it—that their
sense of touch made it immediately apparent to them that the felt
object was contraband."' If this occurs, the plain feel doctrine will
212 See State v. Wilson, 437 S.E.2d 387, 389 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
273 See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742-43 (1983) (incriminating nature of balloon was
immediately apparent, only because officer's training and experience made him aware that
balloons tied in that manner were frequently used to carry narcotics); United States v. Matthews,
942 F.2d 779, 783 (10th Cir. 1991) (incriminating nature of weapons immediately apparent only
because located in close proximity to illegal drugs); United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1070
(7th Cir. 1990) (incriminating nature of spiral notebook apparent only when officers searching
for cocaine saw that notebook contained notations as to grams, ounces, and whether individuals
paid or owed money). For example, suppose that a federal agent, armed with a warrant to search
for and seize evidence of securities fraud, finds a spiral notebook with notations of weight
measurements in plain view. The agent may not be privileged to seize the notebook on a hunch
that it may be evidence of drug trafficking. See Brown, 460 U.S. at 742-43. On the other hand, if
the agent finds a scale, a mirror and a razor blade next to the notebook, then the agent may
have probable cause to believe that the notebook is evidence of drug trafficking. See Id.
274 See State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 102 (Wash. 1982).
275 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, No. 93-378 (1-1L), 1994 WL 380695, at *6 (D.P.R. May 20,
December 19941	 SEARCHES WOVEN FROM TERRY CLOTH	 153
surely allow police to make far greater intrusions than the brief Terry
search would otherwise allow. This potential for abuse leads one to
question the Terry decision itself.
C. Foundational Weaknesses
The Court could have used Dickerson as a vehicle for clarifying
Terry. 276
 If the problem of pretextual searches is substantial enough to
call for some Fourth Amendment remedy, then the Court could have
limited or clarified the authority to make Terry stops. There is a need
for additional guidelines on exactly what criteria give rise to reasonable
suspicion to stop an individual. Police officers should not be permitted
to stop an individual whose only "wrong" was the individual's evasion
of the police, as any given individual may have one of several legitimate
reasons to avoid the police. For example, an individual's prior interac-
tion with police may cause apprehension. Moreover, racial tensions
exist in some communities which may cause citizens to avoid any
unnecessary confrontations with the police.
For these reasons, the Court should devise a standard that requires
more than the mere evasiveness of an individual in order to justify a
stop.277 A rebuttable presumption that evasiveness alone fails to give
rise to reasonable suspicion is one possible standard. The prosecution
could then rebut the presumption by a showing of glaring evasiveness,
or by establishing that the individual's evasiveness demonstrated more
than his or her exercise of the right to avoid police officers. 278
More importantly, the Court should re-examine the authority of a
police officer to frisk an individual based on the lesser standard of
reasonable suspicion. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, seemed
very concerned about the "frisk" portion of the Terry "stop-and-frisk"
when he stated, "I frankly doubt . . . whether the fiercely proud men
who adopted our Fourth Amendment would have allowed themselves
to be subjected, on mere suspicion of being armed and dangerous, to
such indignity . . . "279 Justice Scalia's concern lies, no doubt, in the
1994) (plain feel doctrine justified warrantless seizure of cocaine where officer testified that illegal
nature was immediately apparent, despite fact that cocaine was contained in two packages
wrapped in black tape and hidden under defendant's clothing). But see United States v. Mitchell,
832 F. Supp. 1073, 1079 (N.D. Miss. 1993) (plain feel doctrine did not justify warrantless seizure
of crack cocaine, where cocaine was contained in plastic bags, wrapped in athletic sock, inside
paper bag which defendant carried in lined inside pocket of heavy leather jacket, and police
knew that lump was not weapon).
2" See George E. Dix, stop and Frisk Using a 'Plain Feel' Test, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 25, 1993, at 37.
277 See id.
27e see id.
2" Dickerson, 113 S. CL at 2140 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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realization that the physical touching of an individual represents an
extreme invasion of privacy.
In light of the differences between touching and viewing, the Court
could condition the authority to conduct a patdown search on the more
stringent standard of probable cause, while granting the authority to
stop an individual based on reasonable suspicion. 28° For example, a
suspect, stopped based on reasonable suspicion and then questioned
by the officer, may be unable to alleviate the officer's fears. In such a
situation, the temporary detention of a suspect would be elevated to a
full custodial arrest based on probable cause. 28 ' At that point, the
officer could lawfully conduct not only a protective search for weapons,
but also a full physical search incident to the arrest. 282
The Dickerson Court questioned neither the legality of the stop
nor the frisk. The case provided an excellent opportunity, however, for
the Court to add much needed clarification to the law of stop-and-frisk,
and to impose some limits on police power. Of course, only in rare
circumstances would a court decide questions not before it. 285 The
Dickerson Court, however, did not seem concerned about this policy,
given its unnecessary creation of the plain feel doctrine.
V. ALTERNATIVES AND MODIFICATIONS TO PLAIN FEEL
The Court's creation of the plain feel doctrine in Dickerson was
unnecessary in deciding the case. Instead, the Court merely could have
reasoned that the search of Dickerson exceeded the bounds author-
ized by Terry. Other alternatives to the plain feel doctrine also are
available to address society's interest in fighting crime. One alternative
already is built into the Court's reasoning in Terry. Seizure of an object
is justified under Terry when an officer conducts a further search based
on his or her erroneous belief that a hidden object may be a weapon. 284
If the object instead turns out to be contraband, the contraband is
admissible into evidence. 285
 Second, the officer, upon sensing a suspi-
cious bulge, can obtain a warrant based on probable cause that the
object is contraband. As discussed above, because of the lack of exi-
gency in these situations, in contrast to plain view situations, a warrant-
2841 See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
281 See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
282 See id. (Scalia, J., concurring),
285 See, e.g., Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 112 S. Ct. 1644, 1649 (1992); Youakim v Miller, 425
U.S. 231, 234 (1976).
284 See, e.g., United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 62 (2d Cir. 1977); State v. Evans, 618 N.E.2d
162, 171 (Ohio 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1195 (1994).
285 See,
 e.g., Oates, 560 F.2d at 62; Evans, 618 N.E.2d at 171.
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less search would not be justified. Finally, the officer who senses a
suspicious bulge may obtain the suspect's consent to conduct a further
search for contraband. In this situation, because an individual has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in items which the individual has
allowed to be searched, a warrantless search would be justified. 2"
Recognizing the obvious advantages to law enforcement that Dick-
erson provides, some states may wish to adopt the plain feel doctrine.
Many of these states, however, may wish to provide greater protection
of individual rights than Dickerson would allow. Because the United
States Constitution represents only a floor of individual rights, states,
in interpreting their own constitutions, can provide greater protection
than the United States Constitution requires. 287 Thus, states can modify
the plain feel doctrine, as articulated in Dickerson, in order to lessen
its intrusion on individual rights. 2"
First, states can modify the level of justification required for an
officer to seize an item. For example, although Dickerson requires an
officer to have "probable cause" before seizing an item, a state may
instead require an officer to have "reasonable certainty. "289 In United
States v. Williams, the D.C. Circuit described the latter standard as
"good enough to eliminate all need for additional search activity. "290
The court further explained that such a situation "can only occur when
sensory information acquired by the officer rises to a state of certitude,
rather than mere prediction [as with probable cause], in regard to the
288 See, e.g., United States v. Ponce, 8 F.3d 989, 998 (5th Cir. 1993) (defendant consented to
search of his person which resulted in discovery of heroin in his pocket).
287 See, e.g., Pruncyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Cooper v. California,
386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). For example, eight state supreme courts have rejected, on state constitu-
tional grounds, the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule. See State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d
58, 68 (Conn. 1990); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671-72 (Idaho 1992); State v. Novembrino,
519 A.2d 820, 855 (N.J. 1987); State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, 1067 (N.M. 1993); People v.
Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451, 458 (N.Y. 1985); State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553, 562 (N.C. 1988);
Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 901 (Pa. 1991); State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119, 127 (Vt.
1991). See generally Leigh A. Morrissey, State Courts Reject Leon on State Constitutional Grounds:
A Defense of Reactive Rulings, 47 VAND. L. Rtiv. 917 (1994). The good faith exception was
articulated in United States v. Leon, where the United States Supreme Court held that the
exclusionary rule should not be applied to evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable
reliance on a search warrant which was issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, but ultimately
found to be invalid. 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
255
	 state courts have already discussed state constitutional issues raised by Dickerson, See
People v. Mitchell, 630 N.E.2d 451, 454 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (state court adopts plain feel doctrine;
state constitution affords no greater rights in search and seizure cases than the United States
Constitution); In re S.D., 633 A.2d 172, 176, 176 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (search exceeded
bounds of Terry; court does not adopt plain feel doctrine, and suggests that state constitution
may provide more protection to citizens than does the United States Constitution).
2" See United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174, 1184-85 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
2" Id. at 1185,
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object of the investigation."291
 This higher level of certainty would
provide greater protection of individual rights, and thus could be
permitted under states' interpretation of their constitutions.
Second, state courts can develop assurances that the plain feel
doctrine will work properly. States should implement a "motivation"
requirement to ensure that a police officer does not conduct pretex-
tual searches or searches beyond those permitted by Terry. In Dickerson,
the Court never discussed the concept of a "motivation" requirement.
By neither requiring nor rejecting the requirement, the Court has left
room for refinement of the plain feel doctrine. States should seriously
consider this potential for refinement in their adoption of the plain
feel doctrine.
Warrantless seizures of weapons during a lawful Terry stop are
allowed in order to protect the police officer and others nearby. 292
Where the police officer only intends and anticipates the discovery of
items other than weapons, however, the justification of protecting the
police and the public loses its force. Thus, an inquiry into the intent
of the officer conducting the search is necessary to determine pretext.
The proposed "motivation" requirement functions similarly to
the inadvertence requirement originally articulated in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire. 293
 The Court, in Horton v. California, eschewed the inadver-
tence requirement in the context of the plain view doctrine. 294 The
differing circumstances between plain view and plain feel seizures,
however, demonstrate the merit of an analogous requirement for the
plain feel doctrine.
In many, if not most, plain view situations, law enforcement officers
procure a warrant before conducting a search. 295
 A warrant is issued
by a neutral and detached magistrate, upon a showing of probable
cause, and must describe with particularity the place to be searched
and the items to be seized. 296
 These three requirements provide safe-
guards to ensure that the law enforcement officer making the plain
view seizure had some justification for conducting a search.
291 /d. The court held that the officer met this standard, and thus concluded that admission
of the evidence was proper. Id. at 1186. The court based its conclusion on the officer's testimony
that he "could feel" numerous small rolled-up objects, and that he "believed" that the bag
contained numerous quarter bags of heroin, Id. at 1186 n.121. When asked to explain the basis
for his conclusion, the officer stated that "from feeling [the bag, he] could tell it was a large
amount, small rolled-up objects that felt like plastic baggies." Id.
292 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
293 403 U.S. 443, 469-70 (1971).
294 See 496 U.S. 128, 139-40 (1990).
"5 See, e.g., id. at 131.
296
 See, e.g., United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 758 (3d Cir. 1982).
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In contrast, a search warrant will never precede a seizure author-
ized by the plain feel doctrine. The plain feel doctrine, by definition,
is invoked in the context of a warrantless Terry stop-and-frisk. Because
all three safeguards inherent in the warrant requirement are nonex-
istent in a Terry context, the likelihood is much greater that no justifica-
tion existed for the initial search. Accordingly, the plain feel doctrine
requires more protection against pretextual searches than necessary with
the plain view doctrine. Thus, states, in adopting the plain feel doc-
trine, may wish to resurrect the inadvertence requirement of Coolidge,
in order to guard against potential abuse.
States may fashion this requirement differently. For example, a
court can evaluate the subjective intent of the officer by making infer-
ences from testimony pertaining to the objective circumstances sur-
rounding the search. This standard would provide the most protection
of individual rights. Noting the difficulty of determining the officer's
motive, however, the Supreme Court has suggested that the officer's
subjective intent should be irrelevant. 297 Yet, the problems inherent in
determining the officer's subjective intent can be mitigated. Rather
than focusing on an officer's state of mind, a court can focus on an
objective evaluation of the officer's conduct and ignore the officer's
underlying, personal motivations. 298 For example, the Eleventh Circuit
held that in determining whether an investigative stop is invalid as
pretextual, the proper inquiry is whether a reasonable officer would
have made the seizure in the absence of illegitimate motivation. 299
297 See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985) (sale of obscene material to police
officer was not retrospectively transformed into warrantless seizure by virtue of officer's subjective
intent to retrieve purchase money to use as evidence); United States V. Villamonte-Marquez, 462
U.S. 579, 583-84 (1983) (officer's boarding of defendant's vessel and subsequent seizure of
marijuana was lawful, despite officer's potentially devious motivations for conducting search for
narcotics); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1978) (officer's state of mind or subjective
intent during search is not relevant when judge reviews officer's conduct).
298 See United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986) (determination of pretextual
search should be based on objective evaluation of officer's conduct).
299 See id. at 709. In Smith, the defendant drove past a police officer. Id. at 706. The officer
had a hunch, based on a drug courier profile, that the defendant was transporting drugs. Id. He
followed the defendant for one and one-half miles and, after observing the defendant weave six
inches into the adjacent lane, he pulled over the defendant's car. Id. Subsequently, the officer
arrested the defendant for possession of cocaine. Id. The court held that in determining whether
an investigatory stop is unreasonably pretextual, the fact that the officer could have made the
stop is irrelevant. Id. at 709. Rather, the proper inquiry is whether a reasonable officer would
have made the stop. Id. Because a reasonable officer would not stop an individual who drifted a
mere six inches into an adjacent lane, the court concluded that the stop was pretextual and
excluded the evidence. Id.; see also United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1987)
(proper inquiry in determination of pretextual search is whether reasonable officer could have
made seizure).
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Although this standard may be less protective of individual rights, it
would nonetheless provide defendants in extreme circumstances with
some level of protection.
Under either of the above standards, state courts may place the
burden of proof on either the government or the defendant. 30° Al-
though placing the burden of proof on the government would provide
more protection of individual rights, shifting the burden to the defen-
dant would avoid unnecessary delay in trials where pretext is clearly
not at issue. If the defendant can make a showing that the officer
intended to search only for items other than weapons, then the items
should be subject to the exclusionary rule and inadmissible as evi-
dence. Such conduct would constitute a deliberate attempt to circum-
vent the constitutional requirement of a warrant "particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,"
and cannot be condoned.s° 1
VI. CONCLUSION
In Minnesota v. Dickerson, the United States Supreme Court rec-
ognized a plain feel exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement. The doctrine provides that where an officer feels an
object in the course of a Terry stop, and this touching provides prob-
able cause for a further search or seizure, the further intrusion need
not be authorized by a warrant. The Court held, however, that the frisk
must remain within the bounds of the weapons frisk permitted by
Terry.
In its reasoning, the Court turned its back on reality. Because it
would be virtually impossible to gain probable cause from the mere
touching of an object through clothing, it is difficult to imagine a
situation where a plain feel seizure would be justified. To soften the
potential for abuse, state courts wishing to adopt the plain feel doctrine
may interpret their own constitutions to provide greater protection
than the United States Constitution requires. In order to ensure that
police officers do not conduct pretextual searches or searches beyond
those permitted by Terry, state courts should impose a motivation
requirement. If mitigating the problems inherent in determining the
officer's subjective intent is necessary, the burden of establishing a
police officer's illegitimate motive could be placed on the defendant,
31x1 The government may have the burden of proving the absence of art illegitimate motiva-
tion. Alternatively, the defendant may have the burden of establishing that the officer conducted
a pretextual search.
101
 See Horton, 496 U.S. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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and could be satisfied in the form of objective evidence. To authorize
a plain feel seizure without allowing the defendant this opportunity
would give law enforcement officers carte blanche to conduct illegal
searches and seizures. This conduct must not be permitted, if the
Fourth Amendment is to have any meaning at all.
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